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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1768 
_____________ 
 
DENISE STEWART (formerly Gruninger) 
 
v. 
 
AMERICA'S SERVICING COMPANY 
 
                   DENISE STEWART, 
                                      Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                             
District Court  No. 2-08-cv-00572 
District Judge: The Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin  
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2011 
 
 
Before: McKee, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judges, 
and STEARNS, District Judge
*
 
 
 
(Filed:  January 28, 2011) 
                              
                                                 
*
   The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United States 
District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
On December 6, 2005, Denise Gruninger, now Stewart, refinanced her home at 
207 Stoneway Lane, Merion Station, Pennsylvania.  Although the Mortgage obligated 
Stewart to pay certain amounts for escrow items such as taxes, insurance, and other 
assessments, Atlantic Pacific Mortgage Corporation, the Mortgagee, waived the escrow 
requirement.  The “Escrow Waiver” obligated Stewart to pay the escrow items when due 
and to provide proof of payment upon receipt.  Under the terms of the Escrow Waiver, 
“[f]ailure to pay such items when due . . .  g[a]ve Lender the right to reinstate the 
requirement that these items be paid to Lender to be placed in escrow and paid monthly 
for the remaining term of the loan.”   
 Stewart’s Mortgage was transferred to Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust  
2006 1AR.  GMAC initially serviced the loan for Morgan Stanley.  Morgan Stanley 
subsequently terminated its agreement with GMAC, however,  and granted Wells Fargo 
the right to service its loans through Wells Fargo’s servicing arm, America’s Servicing 
Corporation (ASC).  As a result, Stewart received notice in September of 2006 that 
GMAC would no longer be servicing her loan and that ASC would be responsible for 
processing her loan payments.  On June 22, 2007, ASC sent Stewart a letter indicating 
that it had  received information that her real estate taxes were past due.  ASC asked for 
proof of payment.  In the alternative, ASC offered to assist her  
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in paying the full amount of the past due taxes, including all applicable 
interest/penalty due.  An escrow account will be established on your behalf 
for the collection of the advance, as well as all future tax bills.  Your 
monthly mortgage payment will increase to repay the advance and to 
collect for a monthly escrow deposit.   
 
Stewart requested that ASC pay the past due taxes.  It did, and, consistent with its offer of 
assistance and the terms of the Mortgage, it established an escrow account in her name.  
Thereafter, Stewart denied that she had agreed to establish an escrow account and she 
refused to pay the escrow amount due with her monthly payments.  ASC then advised 
Stewart that her payments were insufficient.  She again disputed ASC’s action in 
establishing an escrow account and asserted that ASC had breached the terms of the 
Mortgage.  On January 7, 2008, because of Stewart’s failure to pay the entire sum due, 
ASC notified Stewart that she was in default and that it intended to foreclose on her 
home.  
 Almost a month later, on February 5, 2008, Stewart initiated this civil action 
against ASC.  The two-count complaint alleged claims under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f, and the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B).  After her counsel obtained leave to 
withdraw, Stewart proceeded pro se.
1
  She filed an amended complaint, alleging liability 
on ASC’s part for violating the FDCPA, RESPA, breach of contract, defamation, tortious 
interference with contract, Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protections Law, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and Pennsylvania’s 
                                                 
1
   Although Stewart proceeded pro se in the District Court, she is now represented by 
legal counsel. 
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Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act.  
After discovery closed, ASC filed a motion for summary judgment on each claim.  
In a thorough decision dated February 22, 2009, the District Court considered each claim, 
ruling in ASC’s favor.  Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal.2  Thereafter, on June 8, 
2009, Stewart, as Borrower, and Wells Fargo Bank d/b/a ASC, as Lender, executed a 
Loan Modification Agreement that acknowledged the outstanding Note and Mortgage 
and, inter alia,  reduced her fixed yearly interest rate to 4.5%. 
Before us, Stewart does not contend that the District Court erred by dismissing any 
particular claim.  Instead, despite executing the Loan Modification Agreement with ASC 
during the pendency of this appeal, Stewart contends that summary judgment should not 
have been granted because ASC failed to establish that it had a right to service her loan.  
According to Stewart, the affidavit submitted by ASC’s representative, Ms. Jennifer 
Robinson, was inadmissible because Robinson lacked personal knowledge about the 
Morgan Stanley trust documents.  
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c)(2) provides that summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  The District Court appropriately considered Robinson’s affidavit, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2
   The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a District Court’s 
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was based on her personal knowledge of the contents of Stewart’s loan file.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e)(1).  Robinson’s affidavit described the transactions that established ASC’s 
right to service Stewarts’s loan, including the document in which Morgan Stanley 
terminated GMAC as the servicing agent and agreed to utilize ASC’s services.  Thus, 
Stewart, as the nonmoving party, had to go beyond the pleadings by way of affidavits or 
other admissible evidentiary material to establish that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact for trial.  Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994).  Yet, as the  District 
Court pointed out, Stewart did not produce any evidence rebutting the affirmations in 
Robinson’s affidavit.  As a consequence, we find no error in the District Court’s 
determination that ASC demonstrated that it had the right to service Stewart’s loan.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.  EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 
618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
